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Abstract
This paper analyzes a government’s incentives to provide financial assistance to a public
bank which is hit by a liquidity shock. We show that discretionary decisions about emer-
gency liquidity assistance result in either excessively small or excessively large liquidity
injections in a wide variety of circumstances. Also, adding a lender of last resort does
not generally ensure a socially optimal policy. However, optimal rules exist that align the
preferences of the government and/or a lender of last resort with social preferences by
either subsidizing or taxing liquidity aid.
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1 Introduction
In 1995, the average percentage of state ownership in the banking industry around the
world was about 41.6 percent (La Porta et al, 2002). The subsequent trend towards
privatization of public banks has been stopped by the recent worldwide financial crisis. In
the course of the crisis, legislators in many countries introduced special bank restructuring
and resolution schemes allowing governments to nationalize insolvent private banks. The
aim was to prevent a sudden and disorderly collapse of systemically important financial
institutions (SIFIs) with solvency problems, which were perceived as being ”too big to
fail” (Cihak and Nier, 2010). Accordingly, publicly owned banks still play an important
role in the banking industry.1
When a public bank or a nationalized bank is hit by a major liquidity shock, crisis
management is often a joint operation by multiple authorities. The government owning
the bank can provide emergency liquidity in an attempt to keep the bank in operation.
This distinguishes a public bank from private banks, whose owners are typically unable
to provide or raise sufficiently large amounts of emergency liquidity at sufficiently short
notice. In most countries, emergency liquidity assistance can also be provided by the
national central bank, or occasionally by deposit insurers.2
These authorities pursue different goals and act under different constraints (Nakaso,
2001). A government may take budgetary measures but fear political opposition against
the utilization of public funds. Central banks have the capacity to grant emergency loans,
1 Cases in point for systemically important financial institutions, which were nationalized during the
financial crisis, are Hypo Real Estate and Commerzbank in Germany or the Belgian/French conglom-
erate Dexia, which was split up in 2011 into a Belgian and a French banking arm and resumed by the
Belgian and French governments, respectively. Recent Data on the relevance of government owned
banks can be found in the Worldbank Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey, which was completed
in 2012, see http://go.worldbank.org/SNUSW978P0 and Barth et al (2012).
2 According to Barth et al (2006: 133) 69 out of 152 countries had an explicit deposit insurance scheme
in 2002/2003.
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but fear financial losses and risking their financial soundness. In most instances, they
do not have to compensate losses of depositors as deposits are usually insured by the
government or a (public or private) deposit insurance company.
Allowing multiple authorities with diverging mandates to decide about the provision
of financial assistance may result in coordination failures. They may lead to delays in the
rescue of failing banks or in socially suboptimal policies with the authorities providing too
much (excessive forbearance) or too little (excessive intervention) financial assistance.3
To prevent coordination failures, central bank officials sometimes propose working out a
specific loss sharing rule between the central bank and the government (Nakaso, 2001).
However, to the best of our knowledge, such rules have not been implemented in any
country, yet.
In this paper, we develop a theoretical model to investigate the implications of different
regulatory frameworks for emergency liquidity provision to public banks or private banks
which have been nationalized. Our analysis focuses on three aspects: First, we investigate
the incentives of a government that owns a public bank to provide emergency liquidity in
times of a crisis. We find that under discretion the behavior of the government will not be
socially optimal unless it (i) faces no binding fiscal constraint, (ii) places the same weight
on social bank failure costs as society does, and (iii) is solely responsible for guaranteeing
deposits.4 Second, we discuss the implications of adding a lender of last resort (LLR) - the
central bank or the deposit insurer - to the discretionary case. We find that the allocation
3 Barth et al. (2006: 57) report cases of apparently too generous public financial assistance. Recent
examples for coordination problems resulting in delays in the provision of financial assistance are the
cases of Glitnir Bank, the first Icelandic bank that collapsed in September 2008, and of Northern
Rock which, on August 13, 2007, got into difficulties in renewing its short-term borrowings, see
Benediktsdottir et al (2010, 2011), Hall (2008) and Shin (2009). On the case of Fortis, a Belgian-
Dutch banking an insurance group which got into difficulties in September 2008, see Dewatripont et
al. (2010).
4 Blume and Voigt (2013) and Tagkalakis (2013) are recent contributions that discuss limits on fiscal
policy.
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of the LLR function will be relevant only if the deposit insurer has guaranteed at least
some deposits of the public bank that is hit by the liquidity crisis. Then, the deposit
insurer tends to be less willing to provide funds as LLR than the central bank as he fears
potential costs of guaranteeing deposits in case of bank failure. Adding a LLR, however,
does not generally enhance social welfare. Third, we show that optimal rules exist that
align the agents’ preferences with social preferences. Such optimal rules stipulate which
agent decides on whether the public bank receives liquidity assistance and either force the
LLR to subsidize (in case of too small liquidity injections) or tax (in case of too large
liquidity injections) the provision of emergency liquidity to the public bank.
The paper adds to the growing literature on bank bailouts. The bulk of this literature
rests on the assumption that a bank facing a liquidity crisis is forced into bankruptcy
unless it obtains outside financial assistance. Accordingly, the results of this literature
can only be applied to private banks with dispersed ownership which are unable to raise
fresh inside liquidity at short notice.5 With its focus on the ex post incentives of the
bank owner and a LLR to provide emergency liquidity, our paper is most closely related
to Repullo (2000) and Kahn and Santos (2005, 2006). They concentrate on the ex post
behavior of a LLR, after a liquidity crisis has emerged, and discuss whether the central
bank or the deposit insurer should act as LLR or as bank supervisor when information
about the solvency of banks is non-verifiable. They show that the optimal allocation of
the LLR function depends on the extent of a bank’s liquidity shortage and that in a multi-
regulator arrangement it is optimal to give supervisory power to the deposit insurer. In
this paper, we extend the framework of Repullo (2000) and Kahn and Santos (2005, 2006)
5 Mitchell (1998), Corbett and Mitchel (2000), Diamond (2001), Osano (2002, 2005), Cordella and
Yeyati (2003), Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008) and Dam and Koetter (2012) focus on the incentive
effects of public bailouts on bank managers. Agion, Bolton and Fries (1999), Mitchell (2001), Tanaka
and Hoggarth (2006), Wilson and Wu (2010), Dietrich and Hauck (2012), Bhattacharya and Nyborg
(2013) and Wilson (2013) compare different policy measures to support distressed banks.
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by explicitly allowing for liquidity provision by bank owners when a liquidity crisis has
occurred, which is plausible for public banks. Therefore, to the best of our knowledge,
this paper is the first that analyzes the ex post incentives to provide support to a public
bank facing a liquidity crisis.
As our focus is on the implications of a given regulatory framework for ex post emer-
gency liquidity provision to distressed public banks, we abstract from scenarios in which
the public authority owning a bank is able to alter regulations, e.g. by reallocating the
LLR function, once a liquidity shock has occurred. This is reasonable if the public bank
is owned by a regional or local authority which does not have the legislative power to
make such legislative changes. Moreover, liquidity shocks require an immediate response
to avoid a run of depositors making it difficult to alter the regulatory framework in time.
Also, our analysis abstracts from possible effects of different bank bailout and deposit
insurance schemes on bank managers’ ex ante risk taking incentives and depositors’ ex
ante monitoring incentives. Although there is no doubt on the relevance of these issues,
turning them off sharpens our focus on the implications of the regulatory framework for ex
post liquidity provision to distressed public banks.6 Throughout the paper we assume that
all deposits are insured with a premium normalized to zero. However, we differentiate our
analysis according to whether insurance is provided by the government, by an independent
deposit insurance scheme (as in Switzerland or Germany), or jointly by both institutions.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model set-up and derives
optimal financial assistance in the benchmark case with no informational asymmetries.
Section 3 analyzes the government’s incentives to provide emergency liquidity under dis-
6 The ex ante incentive effects of bank bailout schemes have already been discussed extensively in the
literature, see the aforementioned references. For the ex ante incentive effects of deposit insurance
schemes, see, e.g., Chan, Greenbaum and Thakor (1992) and Allen, Carletti and Leonello (2011).
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cretion with and without a LLR. Section 4 proposes a rule, which ensures optimal liquidity
assistance. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model Set-up and Benchmark Case
We consider an economy with three agents at some date t: a government and two regula-
tory authorities, the central bank and a deposit insurance agency. The government owns
and runs a public bank which is hit by a liquidity shock. This shock will force the bank
into liquidation unless it obtains sufficient emergency liquidity. The government is able
to provide emergency liquidity to its bank. Also, the regulatory authorities are able to
provide fresh liquidity. However, they may do so only if they have the right to serve as a
LLR to the public bank.
At a previous date t − 1, the public bank has invested EUR 1 in an indivisible, long-
term project. The project is illiquid. It matures at date t+ 1. If the bank liquidates the
project prematurely at the current date t, it will obtain only a small return L ∈ (0, 1).
If the bank pursues the project until maturity, it will yield either a return R > 1 (with
probability p) or nothing at all. At t−1, the probability of success p is a random variable.
At the current date t, the government, which owns the public bank, privately observes the
realization of p.
The public bank has financed its investment at date t− 1 through deposits with face
value D = 1. The deposit insurance agency guarantees a share ω ∈ [0, 1] of these deposits,
the remaining share 1−ω of deposits is guaranteed by the government. We assume that a
stipulated sharing rule is always obeyed ex post.7 Depositors can withdraw their deposits
7 Japan before 1986 formed an example for a country with ω = 0. All deposits were guaranteed by
the Ministry of Finance; the opposite case are the US where the government does not provide any
deposit insurance. Many other countries are characterized by ω ∈ (0, 1), deposits are co-insured by
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either early at t or late at t + 1. A publicly observable fraction v ∈ (0, 1) of deposits is
withdrawn early at the current date t. As the public bank has no liquid funds at this
date, v can be viewed as a liquidity shock that hits the bank. If the government or a
LLR provides a liquidity injection of v, the bank is able to repay early depositors without
terminating the long-term project. Otherwise, the public bank must liquidate the project.
In this scenario, bankruptcy of the public bank can occur at date t or at date t+ 1. At
both points in time, bankruptcy of the public bank is associated with social costs C. As
in Repullo (2000), these costs may comprise the administrative costs of closing the bank
and paying back depositors as well as negative externalities of bankruptcy, like contagion
to other banks or breakup of lending relationships. Bankruptcy will occur at t if the bank
does not receive liquidity assistance from the government or from the LLR, because the
liquidation proceeds L do not cover the claims of all depositors. Bankruptcy will occur at
t + 1 if the bank has obtained financial assistance at t and the project fails at t + 1. In
this case, there are no funds available for paying out late depositors.
All agents in the economy are risk-neutral. Their preferences are represented by
an additive-separable utility function defined over private profits and the social costs of
bankruptcy. As the owner of the bank, the government cares about expected net profits
of the bank, expected costs of guaranteeing the share 1 − ω of deposits, and the social
bankruptcy costs C. It weighs the latter by a factor α > 0. The two regulatory author-
ities, the central bank and the deposit insurer, are assumed to be independent from the
government. Each regulatory authority weighs social bankruptcy costs by a factor β > 0.
In addition, it cares about expected losses (or profits) of providing support as LLR and,
in case of the deposit insurer, about the expected costs of guaranteeing the share ω of
the government and deposit insurers. A case in point is Germany, where deposits are insured by the
banking federation, but an unlimited state guarantee was announced in October 2008.
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deposits. The regulatory authorities supervise the bank. Hence, they find out the realiza-
tion of the success probability p at date t. This information, however, cannot be verified
by the public. Finally, the amount KGOV that the government can inject into the public
bank at t in order to prevent bankruptcy is restricted to KGOV ≤ KGOVmax . This restriction,
e. g., reflects the overall fiscal conditions, which may hamper the government’s ability to
provide fresh liquidity at short notice. Assuming KGOVmax ≥ (1−ω)(1−L), the upper bound
is large enough to ensure that the government credibly can guarantee a share 1−ω of the
claim 1− L of depositors if the public bank goes bankrupt at t and is forced to liquidate
its project.
Before analyzing the incentives of the government and a LLR to provide emergency
liquidity to the public bank, it is useful to examine a first best world, in which the proba-
bility of success p is publicly observable and verifiable. This case will serve as a benchmark
for our later analysis. In a first best world, from the perspective of social welfare, it is
optimal to provide liquidity assistance to the public bank at date t whenever the expected
returns less the social bankruptcy costs of continuing the project are (weakly) higher than
the liquidation proceeds, net of C. Thus, the public bank should obtain sufficient liquidity
at date t if pR− (1− p)C ≥ L− C. As in Repullo (2000), this leads to:
p ≥ LR+C =: pfb. (1)
Condition (1) states that in order to maximize social welfare, the bank should be closed if
and only if the success probability of its long-term project is below a certain threshold pfb.
This threshold is higher, the higher is the liquidation value L of the project and the lower
are the potential long-term project returns R and the bankruptcy costs C. Moreover, pfb
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does not depend on the magnitude v of the liquidity shock at t. This is for two reasons.
First, any provision of emergency liquidity leads to a pure redistribution of wealth from the
liquidity provider to the public bank. Second, neither the potential liquidation proceeds
nor the long-term project returns or the social bankruptcy costs depend on v.
3 Provision of Emergency Liquidity under Discretion
The success probability p of the public bank’s project is neither publicly observable nor
verifiable. Therefore, it is impossible to directly implement the first best provision of
emergency liquidity as specified in (1). However, one might aim to implement the first
best indirectly. This might be achieved by a suitably designed regulatory framework.
In this section, we concentrate on regulatory frameworks which allow agents to provide
emergency liquidity in a discretionary way. We analyze three different scenarios. In the
first, neither the central bank nor the deposit insurer is allowed to serve as a LLR so
that only the government can prevent the public bank from going bankrupt at date t. In
the second, the LLR function is allocated to the central bank. In the third, the deposit
insurance agency may serve as a LLR instead of the central bank. We will see that all
frameworks fail to implement a first best provision of emergency liquidity.
3.1 No Lender of Last Resort
If no regulatory authority may serve as LLR, the public bank will survive at date t only
if it receives support from the government. Accordingly, the bank will be forced into
bankruptcy at this date whenever the liquidity shock v exceeds the maximum amount
KGOVmax that the government is able to provide. Otherwise, the government can choose
between two options. It can either inject liquid funds KGOV = v ≤ KGOVmax into the public
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bank. This prevents immediate bankruptcy. Alternatively, it can refuse to support the
bank, so that the bank goes bankrupt at date t.
For a given liquidity shock v, the government will provide a liquidity injection KGOV =
v to prevent bankruptcy of the public bank at date t only if it is able and willing to do
so. This requires v ≤ KGOVmax and:
−v + p [R− (1− v)]− (1− p) [(1− ω) (1− v) + αC] ≥ − [(1− ω) (1− L) + αC] . (2)
The left-hand side of (2) reflects the government’s expected payoff when providing sufficient
emergency liquidity so that the public bank continues to exist until t+ 1. In this case, the
government must inject the amount v into the bank at date t. This amount is used to pay
out early depositors. If the project of the public bank is successful at t+1, a return R will
materialize and late depositors receive 1− v from the bank. If the project fails, the bank
cannot pay anything to late depositors. Due to the guarantee of deposits, the government
then must settle a share 1 − ω of the total claim 1 − v of late depositors. Moreover,
the government must bear the weighted social bankruptcy costs. The right-hand side of
(2) reflects the government’s payoff when the bank is closed at date t. In this case, the
liquidation proceeds L < 1 are used entirely to repay depositors, the government must
repay a share 1 − ω of the remaining deposits 1 − L, and the government suffers again
from the social bankruptcy costs.
From the restriction v ≤ KGOVmax and from (2), we directly obtain:
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Lemma 1 If no LLR exists, the public bank will obtain sufficient emergency liquidity only
if p ≥ p, where p is defined by:
p =

ωv+(1−ω)L
R−ω(1−v)+αC if v ≤ KGOVmax ,
∞ if v > KGOVmax .
(3)
The lemma reveals that the government will provide emergency liquidity only if the liq-
uidity shock v of the public bank is sufficiently small and the probability of success p is
sufficiently large. The relevant threshold KGOVmax for the liquidity shock simply reflects the
maximum ability of the government to raise fresh funds at date t. If v does not exceed this
threshold, the relevant threshold p for the probability of success as defined in (3) depends
on the fraction ω of deposits that is guaranteed by the deposit insurer. In this regard, it
is useful to distinguish between two cases.
First, consider the case ω = 0, in which the government is solely responsible for
guaranteeing deposits. For this case, (3) states that the threshold p does not depend
on the magnitude of the liquidity shock. As the government guarantees all deposits, the
timing of deposit withdrawals is irrelevant for its decision to rescue the public bank.
Second, consider the case ω > 0, in which the government shares the responsibility
of guaranteeing deposits with the deposit insurer. In this case, the threshold p is higher,
the higher is the magnitude v of the liquidity shock, see (3). Accordingly, the government
is the more reluctant to provide support to the bank, the higher is the shock. This is
because the larger is the liquidity shock of the public bank at date t, the higher will be
the costs of rescuing the bank, which are fully borne by the government, relative to the
government’s costs of guaranteeing a share 1− ω of deposits in the event of insolvency of
the public bank.
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Figure 1: Liquidity Provision by the Government
By comparing p with the first best threshold pfb as defined in (1), we can conclude
Proposition 1 The threshold p has the following properties:
• For ω = 0:
p > pfb if α < 1 or v > KGOVmax ,
p < pfb if α > 1 and v ≤ KGOVmax ,
p = pfb if α = 1 and v ≤ KGOVmax .
• For ω > 0:
p > pfb if v > v̂ or v > KGOVmax ,
p < pfb if v < v̂ and v ≤ KGOVmax ,
p = pfb if v = v̂ and v ≤ KGOVmax ,
where v̂ is defined by:
v̂ := ω(R+C−1)−(1−α)Cω(R+C−L) L.
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Figure 1 illustrates the efficiency of government’s actions in absence of a LLR for ω = 0
on the left hand side and for ω > 0 on the right hand side. It shows that first best behavior
of the government will not be observed unless some rather specific prerequisites are met.
In case the government must fully guarantee deposits, ω = 0, the threshold p coincides
with the first best threshold pfb only if α = 1 and v ≤ KGOVmax , so that the government
perfectly internalizes the social bankruptcy costs and is able to cope with the liquidity
shock. For α < 1 or v > KGOVmax , p will be higher than p
fb. Then, the government is too
tough. For any p ∈ [pfb, p), it will not provide liquid funds to the bank, although this
would be optimal from a first best perspective. This overly tough behavior stems from a
too small weight that the government places on potential bankruptcy cost avoidance or
from the government’s inability to provide a sufficiently large liquidity injection. If α > 1
and v ≤ KGOVmax , it follows that p < pfb; the government will be too soft. It will provide
liquidity assistance to the bank in some instances, although the bank would be closed in
a first best world.
Matters are different when ω > 0, so that the government does not guarantee all
deposits. Then, it will behave in line with the first best only if a liquidity shock v = v̂ ≤
KGOVmax emerges. For larger (smaller) shocks, the government will again be too tough (soft)
relative to the first best.
3.2 Central Bank as Lender of Last Resort
Under what conditions will the public bank obtain sufficient emergency liquidity at date
t to prevent bankruptcy if we add the central bank as a LLR? To answer this question,
we proceed in three steps. First, we determine the maximum amount of liquidity that the
central bank is willing to inject into the public bank to prevent bankruptcy. Then, we
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determine the maximum amount that the government is willing and able to contribute.
In the last step, we determine whether these amounts suffice to save the bank.
The central bank has not guaranteed deposits. It is not responsible for paying out
depositors when the public bank goes bankrupt. Therefore, the central bank cares only
about its potential costs of serving as a LLR to the public bank and about the weighted
social bankruptcy costs. The central bank thus prefers to pay KCB for a rescue of the
public bank over the bank’s liquidation at date t if:
−KCB − (1− p)βC ≥ −βC, (4)
which can be rearranged to:
KCB ≤ pβC =: K̂CB.
Thus, the willingness to pay K̂CB of the central bank increases in the success probability
p of the public bank’s project, the social bankruptcy costs C, and in the central bank’s
weight β of these costs. Note that we treat KCB as a one-off payment from the central
bank to the public bank that is not repaid. Alternatively, we could assume that the central
bank provides a credit which must be repaid with a positive probability. Then, we could
reinterpret KCB as the difference between the credit amount provided at date t and the
expected credit repayment at date t + 1. This, however, would complicate the analysis
without yielding much additional insight.
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The government’s willingness to pay K̂GOV for a rescue of the public bank is relatively
easy to derive. The government is ready to provide a liquidity injection KGOV ≤ KGOVmax
to prevent immediate liquidation of the public bank at date t only if:
−KGOV + p [R− (1− v)]− (1− p) [(1− ω) (1− v) + αC]
≥ − [(1− ω) (1− L) + αC] .
(5)
Note that (5) differs from the discretionary case (2) without a LLR in only one respect.
Now, the government’s liquidity injection KGOV must not necessarily coincide with v.
Condition (5) can be rearranged to:
KGOV ≤ (1− ω) (v − L) + p [R− ω (1− v) + αC] =: K̂GOV .
As one would expect, K̂GOV decreases in the potential liquidation proceeds L while it
increases in the success probability p of the project, its potential return R, and the social
bankruptcy costs C.
Based on the willingness to pay K̂CB of the central bank, the willingness to pay K̂GOV
of the government and the upper bound KGOVmax , we can now assess whether or not the
bank will obtain sufficient emergency liquidity at date t to prevent bankruptcy. If the sum
of K̂CB and min
{
K̂GOV ,KGOVmax
}
covers the liquidity shock v, the government and the
LLR will agree to rescue the public bank, which then survives until t + 1. If, however,
K̂CB + min
{
K̂GOV ,KGOVmax
}
falls short of v, no arrangement exists which is acceptable
and feasible for both parties and prevents liquidation. Accordingly, we obtain:
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Lemma 2 If the central bank may serve as a LLR, the public bank will obtain sufficient
emergency liquidity only if p ≥ pCB := max{pCBu , pCBr }, where pCBu and pCBr are defined
by:
pCBu :=
ωv+(1−ω)L
R−ω(1−v)+(α+β)C ,
pCBr :=
v−KGOVmax
βC .
Allowing the central bank to serve as a LLR does not fundamentally alter the results.
Still, the public bank will be bankrupt at date t unless the probability of success p of its
project is high enough. The threshold pCB will be equal to either pCBu or p
CB
r . In the
former case, the government is unrestricted. The maximum amount of liquidity KGOVmax
that the government can offer does not bind. In the latter case, KGOVmax imposes a binding
restriction on the government’s liquidity provision.
The threshold pCB will coincide with pCBu as long as the liquidity shock v is relatively
small. In this situation, the liquidity needs of the public bank are small relative to the
willingness to pay of the LLR. As a consequence, KGOVmax does not bind. That is, in case of
pCB = pCBu ≥ pCBr , the threshold for the probability of success is solely determined by the
preferences of the LLR and the government. For large shocks, however, KGOVmax does bind
implying pCB = pCBr > p
CB
u . The restriction then forces the government and the central
bank to let the public bank fail although in some situations they jointly would prefer to
keep the bank in operation.
As long as KGOVmax does not effectively restrict the government, allowing the central
bank to serve as a LLR will alter the threshold pCB relative to p in only one respect. This
change stems from the weight β, which the central bank places on social bankruptcy costs
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and which will be internalized if the LLR function is allocated to the central bank. This
internalization of the social bankruptcy costs suffered by the central bank unambiguously
leads to a softer liquidity provision to the public bank, pCBu < p. However, the threshold
pCBu will still depend positively on the magnitude v of the liquidity shock unless the
government provides a full guarantee of deposits, like in the case without a LLR. Also, the
provision of emergency liquidity will still tend to be tougher, the lower is the joint weight
α+β that the government and the central bank place on the social costs of bankruptcy of
the public bank. If the restriction KGOVmax binds, the positive effect of an increase in v on
the threshold pCB = pCBr will become larger. This is because any increase of the liquidity
needs v of the public bank must be satisfied by the central bank since the government
cannot provide more liquidity than KGOVmax .
Concerning the efficiency implications of allowing the central bank to act as a LLR,
we can conclude:
Proposition 2 The threshold pCB has the following properties:
• For ω = 0:
pCB > pfb if α+ β < 1 or v > v̂CB := v̂CBr ,
pCB < pfb if α+ β > 1 and v < v̂CB := v̂CBr ,
pCB = pfb otherwise.
• For ω > 0:
pCB > pfb if v > v̂CB := min
{
v̂CBu , v̂
CB
r
}
,
pCB < pfb if v < v̂CB := min
{
v̂CBu , v̂
CB
r
}
,
pCB = pfb if v = v̂CB := min
{
v̂CBu , v̂
CB
r
}
,
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Figure 2: Liquidity Provision by Government and Central Bank
where v̂CBu and v̂
CB
r are defined by:
v̂CBu :=
ω(R+C−1)−(1−α−β)C
ω(R+C−L) L,
v̂CBr := K
GOV
max +
βC
R+CL.
The proposition shows that giving the central bank the right to provide liquidity as a
LLR does not help to improve efficiency. A first best support of the public bank is still
out of reach in most instances (see Figure 2). It will only be achieved in two situations.
Either the government is unrestricted and must fully guarantee deposits while the sum of
the weights α and β is equal to one. Or the magnitude of the liquidity shock v coincides
with v̂CB.
3.3 Deposit Insurer as Lender of Last Resort
When appointed as LLR, the deposit insurer will behave differently than the central bank,
because unlike the central bank, the deposit insurer has guaranteed a share ω of deposits.
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Therefore, the deposit insurer is ready to pay KDI for rescuing the public bank at date t
only if:
−KDI − (1− p) [ω (1− v) + βC] ≥ − [ω (1− L) + βC] . (6)
The left hand side of (6) reflects the expected payoff of the deposit insurer if the bank
survives at date t. In this case, the insurer pays KDI to the bank at this date. If the
bank’s project succeeds at t+1, no further costs will accrue. If the project fails and yields
no return, the deposit insurer must pay ω (1− v) to late depositors and will incur the
bankruptcy costs. According to the right hand side of (6), liquidation of the public bank
at date t leads to a payment obligation ω (1− L) of the deposit insurer vis-a-vis those
depositors, who receive nothing from the public bank, and to inevitable bankruptcy costs.
Rearranging (6) leads to:
KDI ≤ ω (v − L) + p [ω (1− v) + βC] =: K̂DI ,
where K̂DI denotes the maximum amount of liquidity that the deposit insurer is willing to
provide. Interestingly, this maximum amount can be negative. This will happen whenever
the liquidity shock v is smaller than the potential proceeds of liquidating the public bank’s
project and the success probability of the project is rather small. In this case, the deposit
insurer finds the potential avoidance of social bankruptcy costs less important than the
long-term costs of guaranteeing deposits. Therefore, the deposit insurer would like to
receive a compensation whenever the public bank is not closed at date t. We will return
to this case of a possibly negative K̂DI shortly.
The government’s incentives to provide emergency liquidity to the public bank at date
t do not depend on the allocation of the LLR function. Therefore, the government is
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still able and willing to rescue the bank as long as KGOV ≤ KGOVmax and (5) is met. Its
willingness to pay still satisfies:
KGOV ≤ (1− ω) (v − L) + p [R− ω (1− v) + αC] =: K̂GOV .
We are now ready to clarify the conditions under which the government and the deposit
insurer will rescue the public bank at date t by providing sufficient emergency liquidity. If
the deposit insurer’s willingness to pay is non-negative, K̂DI ≥ 0, the relevant condition
reads K̂DI + min
{
K̂GOV ,KGOVmax
}
≥ v. The public bank will survive as long as the
joint willingness and ability to pay of the deposit insurer and the government covers the
liquidity needs of the public bank. In case of a negative willingness to pay K̂DI of the
deposit insurer, things are a bit more complex. If the LLR has the unilateral right to
close the bank, the relevant condition will be min
{
K̂GOV ,KGOVmax
}
≥ v + |K̂DI |. This
is because the government not only must pay at least v to the public bank but it must
also pay at least |K̂DI | to the deposit insurer since otherwise the deposit insurer would
close the bank a t. If, however, the LLR has no unilateral right to close the bank, the
relevant condition will be min
{
K̂GOV ,KGOVmax
}
≥ v. In this case, the government can
simply provide emergency liquidity to the public bank if it wishes to do so, and ignore
the resulting loss of the deposit insurer. As this last case is essentially equivalent to the
situation without any LLR, we assume that the LLR does indeed have the unilateral right
to close the bank, so that we obtain:
19
Lemma 3 If the deposit insurer may serve as a LLR, the public bank will obtain sufficient
emergency liquidity only if p ≥ pDI := max{pDIu , pDIr }, where pDIu and pDIr are defined by:
pDIu :=
L
R+(α+β)C ,
pDIr :=
(1−ω)v+ωL−KGOVmax
ω(1−v)+βC .
If the government is unrestricted, the threshold pDI = pDIu ≥ pDIr will neither depend
on the magnitude v of the liquidity shock nor on how the government and the deposit
insurer share the responsibility to guarantee deposits. Irrespective of ω, these two parties
are jointly responsible for fully guaranteeing deposits. Therefore, the share of early depos-
itors is irrelevant for their decision to rescue the bank. If the restriction KGOVmax binds, the
relevant threshold reads pDI = pDIr > p
DI
u . Then, any increase in v leads to an increase
in the threshold since the associated higher liquidity needs of the public bank must be
completely borne by the deposit insurer.
Interestingly, allowing the deposit insurer to act as LLR, who has the unilateral right
to close the bank, will result in a tougher policy vis-a-vis the public bank whenever the
bank’s liquidity shock is relatively small. In this case, in which pDI > p holds true, the
deposit insurer incurs an expected loss due to its obligation to guarantee deposits if the
bank survives at date t but fails at date t+ 1. Accordingly, the deposit insurer as a LLR
agrees to a rescue of the bank only if he obtains a compensation from the government so
that the latter tends to be tougher than in the case without a LLR.
From Lemma 3 and the first best threshold pfb, we can infer:
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Figure 3: Liquidity Provision by Government and Deposit Insurer
Proposition 3 The threshold pDI has the following properties:
pDI > pfb if α+ β < 1 or v > v̂DI ,
pDI < pfb if α+ β > 1 and v < v̂DI ,
pDI = pfb otherwise,
where v̂DI is defined by:
v̂DI := [βC−ω(R+C−1)]L+(R+C)K
GOV
max
(1−ω)(R+C)+ωL .
A graphical illustration of the efficiency implications of the deposit insurer serving as
LLR is provided in Figure 3. The threshold pDI coincides with the first best pfb under
two circumstances. Either α + β = 1 holds and the shock v is not too large. Then, the
joint weight that the two parties place on social bankruptcy costs coincides with the social
weight of these costs and the upper bound KGOVmax for liquidity coming from the government
is non binding. Or the sum of the weights exceeds 1 and the shock coincides with v̂DI .
Then, the restriction KGOVmax on government’s liquidity provision ensures first best behavior
although the parties excessively internalize bankruptcy costs. For too large shocks v or
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too little internalization of the costs of bankruptcy (α + β < 1), the government and the
LLR will be too tough, pDI > pfb. Finally, overweighing the social cost (α + β > 1) in
conjunction with a sufficiently small shock will result in too soft behavior.
4 Provision of Emergency Liquidity under a Rule
In the preceding section, we have seen that discretion almost never leads to a first best
provision of emergency financial assistance if the government as well as the central bank
or the deposit insurer can act in a self-interested way. Of course, a government might wish
to force the central bank or the deposit insurance to step in and to provide liquidity after
the liquidity shock has occurred. Such commands are impossible, however, if the central
bank or the deposit insurer are independent from the government, as is the case, e.g., in
the European Monetary Union. Given independence of these institutions, it is natural to
ask whether rules for the provision of emergency liquidity to the public bank can improve
efficiency. In principle, a rule in our framework can stipulate (i) which agent may decide
on whether the public bank obtains liquidity aid and (ii) the amount of liquidity that each
agent involved in the rescue of the bank must provide.
This section investigates the implications of such a rule. In analogy to the previous
analysis, we restrict attention to a rule involving two agents. The agent i = GOV ,CB,DI
may decide whether the public bank is actually rescued at date t. If he decides to do so, he
must inject the amount Kirule into the bank. The remainder K
LLR
rule = v −Kirule will then
be provided by the agent j = DI,CB, j 6= i, who serves as LLR. Formally, this rule reads〈
Kirule;K
LLR
rule
〉
with i = GOV ,CB,DI, where i as well as Kirule and K
LLR
rule may depend
on the magnitude of the public bank’s liquidity shock v.
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Four remarks are useful to clarify the rule
〈
Kirule;K
LLR
rule
〉
. First, we do not place any
restriction on Kirule. That is, a rule can, for example, stipulate K
i
rule > v, implying that
KLLRrule is negative. This can be interpreted as a tax that agent i must pay when rescuing
the bank. The rule can also stipulate Kirule < 0, in which case agent i will receive a
premium from the LLR if he decides in favor of a rescue of the bank. Second, for the sake
of simplicity, we treat Kirule as well as K
LLR
rule as a one-off payment from the respective
agent to the bank (in case of Kirule > 0 or K
LLR
rule > 0) or vice versa (in case of K
i
rule < 0 or
KLLRrule < 0) that is not repaid. Third, while i as well as the respective payments K
i
rule and
KLLRrule can be made contingent on the observable liquidity shock v, they cannot be made
contingent on p as the probability of success of the project is not verifiable. Fourth, the
rule leaves no room for self interested discretionary behavior of the LLR. If agent i decides
to rescue the public bank, the LLR must pay KLLRrule irrespective of whether he wishes to
do so or not.
Let us start by investigating the rule
〈
KGOVrule ;K
LLR
rule
〉
. This rule grants veto power
to the government. The public bank will not receive liquidity aid unless the government
prefers the aid over liquidation. The government is able and willing to rescue the bank if
KGOVrule ≤ KGOVmax and
−KGOVrule + p [R− (1− v)]− (1− p) [(1− ω) (1− v) + αC] ≥ − [(1− ω) (1− L) + αC] . (7)
Like in (5), the left hand side of (7) reflects the government’s expected return of providing
support to the public bank at t while the right hand side of (7) reflects the expected return
of letting the bank go bankrupt.
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Under a second rule
〈
KCBrule;K
LLR
rule
〉
, the central bank is the veto player. It will opt for
a rescue of the public bank only if its expected costs of rescuing the bank do not outweigh
the costs of immediate bankruptcy. In analogy to (4), the formal condition reads:
−KCBrule − (1− p)βC ≥ −βC. (8)
Similarly, a third rule
〈
KDIrule;K
LLR
rule
〉
that lets the deposit insurer decide implies that
the public bank survives the liquidity shock at date t if:
−KDIrule − (1− p) [ω (1− v) + βC] ≥ − [ω (1− L) + βC] . (9)
The only difference between (8) and (9) stems from the fact that unlike the central bank,
the deposit insurer is obliged to guarantee a share ω of deposits in case of bankruptcy of
the public bank.
In conjunction with KGOVrule ≤ KGOVmax , the respective conditions (7), (8) and (9) result
in:
Lemma 4 Under a rule
〈
Kirule;K
LLR
rule
〉
with i = GOV ,CB,DI and KLLRrule = v −Kirule,
the public bank will obtain sufficient emergency liquidity only if p ≥ prule, where prule is
defined by:
prule =

∞ if i = GOV and KGOVrule > KGOVmax ,
KGOVrule −(1−ω)v+(1−ω)L
R−ω(1−v)+αC if i = GOV and K
GOV
rule ≤ KGOVmax ,
KDIrule−ωv+ωL
ω(1−v)+βC if i = DI,
KCBrule
βC if i = CB.
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If the rule allows the government to decide about the public bank’s rescue but includes
a payment that the government cannot afford, the bank will be bankrupt at date t irre-
spective of its liquidity shock v and its future prospects. In all other cases, the distressed
public bank will obtain sufficient liquidity assistance under a rule only if the probability of
success of its project is sufficiently large. In this regard, the rule has similar implications
as discretion.
Not surprisingly, the threshold prule depends positively on the amount K
i
rule that agent
i must pay to rescue the bank for any given v. Moreover, the threshold depends negatively
on the magnitude v of the liquidity shock unless the central bank is the veto player. The
higher is v, the less the public bank (and thus the government) must pay to late depositors
at t = 1, which increases the attractiveness of a rescue of the public bank (at given costs
KGOVrule ) from the government’s point of view. For the deposit insurer, a similar argument
applies. A higher v will lower the costs of compensating late deposits if the bank is rescued
at date t but fails to generate a profit at t + 1. For the central bank, the magnitude of
the shock is irrelevant. This is because the central bank neither has a stake in the public
bank’s profits nor guarantees deposits so that it only trades off social bankruptcy costs,
which are independent of v.
By setting prule equal to p
fb and solving for Kirule, we can conclude:
Proposition 4 A first best outcome will be achieved under a rule
〈
Kirule;K
LLR
rule
〉
with
i = GOV ,CB,DI and KLLRrule = v −Kirule if the rule has the following properties:
• For ω = 0:
Kirule =

v − (1− α) CR+CL if i = GOV and KGOVrule ≤ KGOVmax ,
βCL
R+C if i = CB or i = DI.
(10)
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• For ω > 0:
Kirule =

v − ωR+C−LR+C
(
v − v̂GOVrule
)
if i = GOV and KGOVrule ≤ KGOVmax ,
βCL
R+C if i = CB,
v − (1−ω)(R+C)+ωLR+C
(
v − v̂DIrule
)
if i = DI,
(11)
where v̂GOVrule and v̂
DI
rule are defined by:
v̂GOVrule :=
ω(R+C−1)−(1−α)C
ω(R+C−L) L,
v̂DIrule :=
βC−ω(R+C−1)
(1−ω)(R+C)+ωLL.
The proposition reveals that unlike discretion, a suitably designed rule will ensure that
the liquidity provision for the public bank is consistent with the first best. However, to
achieve efficiency, it may be necessary to exclude the government as the owner of the bank
from the decision whether the bank receives aid and to allocate the power to decide to
the central bank or the deposit insurer. This is due to the restriction KGOVmax faced by the
government, that limits the set of feasible rules.
In case of a non binding restriction KGOVmax and ω = 0, in which the government is
solely responsible for guaranteeing deposits, a rule with i = GOV achieves a first best
outcome by a money transfer KLLRrule = v−KGOVrule = (1− α) CR+CL, which does not depend
on the liquidity shock v of the public bank, see (10). Recall from Proposition 1 that under
discretion, the government will be too tough if α < 1. The optimal rule then stipulates a
payment from the LLR to the government, provided that the latter rescues the public bank.
This payment makes the government softer. A first best policy is achieved. If, however,
α > 1 holds true, the government tends to be too soft so that the optimal rule induces
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first best behavior by forcing the government to pay a fixed amount to the LLR when
providing emergency liquidity to the public bank. Thus, in case of ω = 0, an optimal rule
with i = GOV will involve a subsidy if discretion is associated with too tough behavior,
while it will involve a tax if discretion is associated with too soft behavior. Moreover, the
subsidy or tax is independent of v as the behavior of the government under discretion does
not depend on v either. This is due to the government’s obligation to guarantee deposits
fully.
The optimal rule with i = GOV reaches its limits when the shock of the public bank
becomes too large so that the optimal payment KGOVrule of the government exceeds the upper
limit KGOVmax . Then, it is useful to let either the central bank or the deposit insurer decide
on the future of the public bank. Equation (10) reveals that as long as ω = 0, both options
are equivalent. Since neither the central bank nor the deposit insurer must guarantee any
deposits when ω = 0, their respective preferences are identical. Both options include
a fixed payment of the respective agent i. This reflects the central bank’s and deposit
insurer’s tendency to make its decision independently of v. As a consequence, a one-unit
increase in v will lead to a one-unit increase of the payment of the LLR under the optimal
rule. Therefore, sufficiently small shocks are associated with a tax that agent i must pay
to the LLR while large shocks imply a subsidy for agent i.
The case ω > 0, in which some share of deposits is guaranteed by the deposit insurer,
is similar to the case ω = 0. Again, an optimal rule with i = GOV that induces first
best behavior will exist as long as the liquidity shock of the public bank is not too large.
However, (11) states the optimal rule will now depend on the realization of the liquidity
shock v. If v is relatively small, v < v̂GOVrule , the rule stipulates K
LLR
rule = v −KGOVrule < 0,
with
∂KLLRrule
∂v > 0. It thus punishes a rescue of the bank with a tax that decreases in the
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liquidity shock v of the bank. This leads to a first best behavior as the government would
be too soft under discretion with the degree of overly soft behavior being lower, the higher
is v. For larger shocks v > v̂, the rule implies a subsidy KLLRrule > 0, which increases in
v, since under discretion the government tends to be tougher, the higher is the liquidity
shock.
For too large shocks, the first best outcome will again be achieved only if either the
central bank or the deposit insurer has veto power. In the former case, the optimal rule
will (still) involve a payment of the central bank that is independent of the shock. In the
latter case, the optimal payment of the deposit insurer will be higher, the higher is the
shock. In either case, the rescue will again be taxed as long as v is not too large and it
will be subsidized otherwise.
Thus, a first best policy vis-a-vis the public bank can be achieved by a suitably designed
rule, even though the realization of the success probabilities of the bank’s project is not
publicly observable. The optimal rule will depend on the observable magnitude v of the
liquidity shock of the public bank. If this shock is sufficiently low, the rule may allow the
government, that owns the bank, to decide about the rescue of the bank. Otherwise, it
must allocate the power to decide to the central bank or the deposit insurer. Moreover,
the optimal rule will either force the LLR to subsidize a rescue (when agent i tends to be
too tough) or to tax it (when agent i tends to be too soft).
5 Summary
The purpose of this paper was threefold: First, we have analyzed a government’s incentive
to provide financial assistance to a public bank which is subject to a liquidity shock.
Second, we have analyzed the consequences of adding a LLR to the discretionary case.
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Third, we have discussed the implications of implementing a rule that stipulates how
liquidity provision is shared between one agent that decides whether the bank receives
help and the LLR.
We have shown that discretionary decisions by governments to provide financial as-
sistance result in either excessively small or large liquidity injections in a wide variety of
circumstances. Also, adding a LLR does not generally ensure a socially optimal policy.
This is true irrespective of whether the LLR function is allocated to the central bank or
the deposit insurer. However, a first best policy vis-a-vis the public bank can be achieved
by a suitably designed rule, even though the realization of the success probabilities of
the bank’s project is not publicly observable. Depending on the magnitude of the public
bank’s emergency liquidity needs, the optimal rule allocates veto power to the government,
the central bank or the deposit insurer. Besides, the optimal rule either subsidizes a rescue
or taxes it.
This last point may be relevant also for the proper design of bank restructuring and
resolution schemes which are currently introduced in several countries. These schemes
enable national bank supervisors to nationalize SIFIs and either to resolve or to recapital-
ize them. For this purpose, restructuring funds are established by national governments
which are often, as in the case of Germany, financed by a special bank levy, without any
contribution by neither the deposit insurer nor the LLR (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2011).
Our analysis suggests that a rule stipulating some burden-sharing between the bank re-
structuring scheme and either the deposit insurer or the LLR might be welfare-improving
because it prevents the restructuring fund from being both too strict or too loose.
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